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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RETAIL PAYMENT SYSTEM 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This article explores the importance of an efficient retail payment system and 
develops an integrated framework for evaluation of the retail payment system by policy 
makers.  It examines the costs and benefits of the various types of retail payment system, 
focusing on the seven desirable benefits of the retail payment system: (1) finality and 
reversibility; (2) universality (ability to use at point of sale and remotely); (3) 
recordkeeping; (4) liquidity (maximizing interest earning assets); (5) security and safety; 
(6) financial inclusion and access; and (7) fungibility and ease of use (seven benefits). 
The article discusses the Coase Theorem, a proposition from transaction cost 
economics that provides a useful tool for analyzing transaction efficiency.  Increased costs 
are not bad per se since parties are often willing to incur higher costs to achieve their 
desired results, e.g. higher costs for a more secure form of payment.  Indeed, higher costs 
may often generate higher value to both parties to a transaction.  What one wants to reduce 
are “friction” costs, costs that neither party wants to pay to achieve a desired result, e.g. 
higher costs produced by lack of information. 
While each retail payment system provides certain advantages, e.g. cash for small 
transactions, overall the analysis suggests that debit and credit cards represent the most 
desirable payment system for achieving the seven benefits set forth above. This is 
supported by statistics that indicate that retail payments have increasingly moved toward 
card payments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the importance of a well-functioning retail payment system to 
meeting the needs of the markets. A country's payment system is the backbone of its 
economy.  Without an effective system in place to settle financial obligations between 
parties, there will be reduced economic activity in a country, and everyday commerce will 
face significant obstacles.   
The global economy executes about $500 trillion of “real economy” payment 
transactions a year, four fifths of which represent business to business commerce, the 
buying and selling of goods and services between non-financial, non-household entities, 
including governments.
1
  This is roughly five times global GDP (a measure of final 
demand, not intermediate transactions) and is vastly larger than retail sales transactions and 
bill payments that make up the remaining $100 trillion or so.
2
  85% or more of the 
individual transactions (but a small percentage of the value) are executed in “cash,” legal 
tender bank notes and coins.
3
 The remaining 15% of transactions, representing over 90% of 
the value, are largely executed in the small value or retail payments system, in distinction 
from the large value or wholesale payment systems that today are operated by central banks 
to provide real time gross settlement (RTGS) in central bank funds.
4
 
 Beginning with the seminal article by Baxter (1983) that explored the network 
effect and externalities in the payment system, there have been several academic studies 
exploring this topic, in the areas of law, economics, and technology.  Yet, apart from these 
                                                          
1
 KEVIN MELLYN, BROKEN MARKETS: A USER’S GUIDE TO THE POST-FINANCE ECONOMY 11 (2012). 
2
 Id. 
3
 Id. at 58. 
4
 Id. 
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studies, and despite of the importance of the payment system, this topic has been given 
relatively little attention in academic literature.  Authors of finance and economics typically 
assume the existence of a well-functioning payment system in developing their theories and 
models of how markets work. While a convenient assumption, this overlooks the 
complexity and importance of the payment system as a market ecology of its own. 
 This article develops a framework for how the retail payment system should be 
viewed by regulators and other public authorities worldwide, including courts of law, in 
formulating public policy, law, and regulation.  A specific key aim of the research is to 
develop a more integrated and well-articulated framework for evaluating whether particular 
types of regulation will interfere with payment system efficiency.  The article is based on 
existing literature, not on original empirical research.   
An important starting point is understanding the costs and benefits of the retail 
payment system and the various payment methods that it includes.  The article examines 
the costs of achieving seven desirable benefits of the retail payment system: (1) finality and 
reversibility;  (2) universality (ability to use at point of sale and remotely); (3) 
recordkeeping; (4) liquidity (maximizing interest earning assets); (5) security and safety; 
(6) financial inclusion and access; and (7) fungibility and ease of use.  In considering costs, 
the cost of cash payments is used as a benchmark.  The article generally excludes a 
discussion of public benefits, such as the value to the society of eliminating illegal 
payments; it rather concentrates on the benefits to the private sector in conducting efficient 
transactions.  
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This article begins by defining the retail payment system.  It then discusses the 
Coase Theorem, a proposition from transaction cost economics that provides a useful tool 
for analyzing transaction efficiency.  Increased costs are not bad per se since parties are 
often willing to incur higher costs to achieve their desired results, e.g. higher costs for a 
more secure form of payment.  Indeed, higher costs may often generate higher value to both 
parties to a transaction.  What one wants to reduce are “friction” costs, costs that neither 
party wants to pay to achieve a desired result, e.g. higher costs produced by lack of 
information. 
The article then proceeds to look at various factors that come into play in choosing a 
payment method, and looks at the strengths and weaknesses of various retail payment 
instruments in comparison to cash.  It concludes by suggesting how these considerations 
should be incorporated into formation of public policy, law, and regulation. 
II. DEFINITION OF THE RETAIL PAYMENT SYSTEM 
A payment system is a network of interconnecting entities that facilitates the 
exchange of data required to initiate, authorize, clear, and settle cash or credit claims 
between payors and payees.  An efficient payment system accomplishes these tasks at a 
relatively low cost to the parties involved.  Payment systems are not mere infrastructure 
like roads and bridges—they come in various forms, as driven by the needs of transactors, 
to facilitate economic transactions.  Payment systems can be broadly put into two 
categories: large value payment systems and the retail payment system. 
Large value payment systems are payment systems with high volume of value 
transfer, typically used by financial institutions to settle mutual obligations, for example 
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FedWire in the U.S.  Most developed countries have a form of real time gross settlement 
(RTGS) in place, allowing financial institutions to settle mutual obligations on a real time, 
gross settlement basis.
 5
  Many also have a large value net settlement system, for example 
CHIPS in the U.S.  A significant number of countries (23%), typically low income 
countries, also use check clearing systems or other central bank systems for large value 
settlement.
6
 While large value payment systems are clearly important to the efficiency, 
safety, and integrity of a country's financial system, they are not the focus of this study. 
The retail payment system, which is the focus of this study, is the payment system 
that facilitates the exchange of data in the context of retail payments in daily commerce.  
The retail payment system has three primary characteristics, as suggested by the Committee 
on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) and adopted in this study.
7
 First, a retail payment system settles transactions made in 
large numbers by a large number of transactors, as opposed to transactions of financial 
institutions and central banks.  This definition is wide enough to cover business-business as 
well as individual-business and person-to-person payments.  Second, it involves a wide 
range of payment instruments, including point-of-sale payment instruments and those used 
for remote transactions. Third, it makes extensive use of private networks, such as 
automated clearinghouses or credit card companies, in contrast to many forms of large 
value payment systems that are commonly operated by a country's central bank.   
                                                          
5
 It has been pointed out that in some cases, RTGSs are expressly designed to handle both large-value and 
small-value transactions, such that even some types of retail payments could be settled on a real-time, gross 
basis.  See Peter Allsopp, Bruce Summers & John Veale, The Evolution of Real-Time Gross Settlement  (Feb. 
2009), at 13. 
6
 See THE WORLD BANK, Payment Systems Worldwide A Snapshot (2010), at vii. 
7
 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Policy Issues for Central Banks in Retail Payments 6 (2003). 
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III. OVERVIEW OF MAJOR RETAIL PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS 
 For the sake of simplicity this paper discusses retail payment systems at the level of 
instruments used by payors and payees in almost all national payments markets, although 
there are significant differences in how they work in specific countries. Unless otherwise 
noted, this discussion is based on the U.S. retail payment system so that foreign 
developments like real-time ACHs are omitted.  Access systems, which enable Internet 
access to existing payment systems, are not treated independently of the underlying 
payment systems in this paper.
8
 
A. Cash 
Cash is money in the form of physical objects, such as coins and banknotes, issued 
by governments that determine its supply and nominal value by fiat.  As legal tender in 
most jurisdictions, cash enjoys very wide acceptance. However, it is difficult to transmit 
over distances and vulnerable to theft.  Therefore, it is used primarily in face-to-face 
transactions, typically for small amounts. Cash is readily converted to and from ledger 
money in the banking system that forms the basis of all other payment instruments, 
physical and electronic.  
A consumer survey conducted by the Bank of Finland suggests that handiness (in 
small amounts) and quickness of use are the top reasons why people use cash over other 
retail payment instruments.
9
  24.7% of survey respondents indicated handiness as the most 
important reason for cash usage, while 18.9% indicated the speed and quickness of use as 
                                                          
8
 Examples being PayPal, Google Wallet, and similar systems. See The end of a monopoly, THE ECONOMIST 
(May 10, 2014), http://www.economist.com/node/21601624/print. 
9
 See Kari Takala & Matti Viren, Efficiency and Costs of Payments: Some New Evidence from Finland, BANK 
OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS (Nov. 2008), at 19. 
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the primary motivation.
10
  As of late 2014, the amount of cash in circulation in the United 
States was approximately $1.29 trillion, while the figure stood at €971 billion for the 
Eurozone.
11
 
B. Check 
 A check is a document in which one party, the payor, directs his bank to make a 
payment to another party, the payee, from the payor's bank account.  The payee or his 
endorsee deposits the check and “pulls” funds back through the bank collection system 
from the payor’s bank.  Checks were devised for use in large trade transactions often over 
great distances to avoid the need to ship specie, something that was dangerous and, cross-
border, often illegal.
12
  Checks are universal because bills were for centuries the only 
universal payment and credit mechanism. Bank notes developed much later with deposit 
banking in 17
th
 century Europe, and government currency monopolies emerged only in the 
19
th
 century.
13
  Infrastructure for the use and clearing of checks is present in virtually every 
country in the world, regardless of income levels and regions.
14
 
Check usage varies significantly by country, but the overall usage level of checks is 
on the decline worldwide.  Check usage among CPMI countries saw an average decline of 
3.96% per year from 2009 to 2013.
15
  In many European countries, particularly in 
                                                          
10
 Id. 
11
 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, How Much U.S. Currency is in Circulation?, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/currency_12773.htm; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Banknotes and Coins 
Circulation, http://www.ecb.int/stats/euro/circulation/html/index.en.html. 
12
 See generally Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, The Evolution of the Check as a Means of Payment: A 
Historical Survey, 93 ECON. R. (NO. 4) 1 (2008). 
13
 See id. at 8. 
14
 Massimo Cirasino & Jose Antonio Garcia, Measuring Payment System Development  (2008), at 37. 
15
 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Statistics on Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in 
the CPMI Countries – Figures for 2013, http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d120.pdf. 
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Scandinavia, check usage has virtually disappeared in favor of direct bank transfers and 
electronic payment cards.
16
  The United States remains one of the top users of checks.  In 
2012, a total of 18.3 billion check transactions took place in the United States for a total 
value of $25.9 trillion.
17
  However, from 2009 to 2012 there was a 9.2% per year decline in 
the number of checks paid in the U.S. (with the value of such checks declining by 6.5% per 
year during the same period).
18
   
Chakravorti and McHugh (2002)
19
 suggest that the lack of financial incentives to 
move away from the check system, including the substantial revenue made by financial 
institutions from check usage (in particular from non-sufficient-funds fees), is the primary 
reason the United States lags behind other countries in replacing checks with electronic 
payment methods.  For consumers, the incentive to switch away from checks is weak 
because merchants rarely impose additional fees for check payments, and the added cost 
saving from using electronic systems may not be great enough to justify abandoning the 
check system that they are more familiar with, although it may be increasingly hard for 
consumers to pay by check.  The study also speculates that for merchants, the cost of 
processing checks, including the risk of not being able to convert the checks to good funds, 
may not be significantly greater than for electronic alternatives such as debit cards.  The 
study also notes the Federal Reserve's continued effort to improve the check processing 
system may also impede the adoption of electronic alternatives.  Interbank processing and 
                                                          
16
 A global survey of payment usage conducted for the year 2006 indicated that an average of 0.1 and 0.2 
checks were used per capita in Finland and Norway, respectively.  See Payment Systems Worldwide A 
Snapshot, supra, at 102, 103. 
17
 The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study (July 2014). 
18
 Id. 
19
 See Sujit Chakravorti & Timothy McHugh, Why Do We Use So Many Checks?, 3Q ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 44 (2002). 
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clearing of checks are virtually all electronic, whether by electronic image exchange or 
conversion to ACH payments. Reinforcing this trend, in 2012, about one in six checks was 
deposited by accountholders as an electronic image rather than as a paper check
20
 
 
C. Payment Cards 
A payment card is a device that can be used by the cardholder to make retail 
payments.  It is typically in the form of a plastic card that electronically stores information 
in a magnetic strip or an embedded chip, which can be processed by the merchant's point-
of-sale system to receive payments.  Payment is made by transferring funds from the 
cardholder's account or line of credit to the payee's account through a card collection 
system.   
The two major types of payment cards are debit cards and credit cards.  Debit cards 
are electronic payment instruments that, when processed, transfer funds directly from the 
cardholder's financial institution account to the payee's bank account.  Credit cards, while 
                                                          
20
 The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study (July 2014). 
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similar in practical usage to debit cards, transfer funds from the cardholder's line of credit 
with the financial institution that issued the card.  Typically, the cardholder does not incur a 
charge for the line of credit when the balance is paid within a month of the date the debt 
arises, plus some number of days (e.g. 10 or 15).  After this "grace period," the remaining 
balance incurs interest and is carried over to the next payment period as a revolving 
balance.
21
 
Card payments are usually processed through a private network, which can be either 
an "closed" system or a "open" system.  In closed systems, such as Discover and American 
Express, the card issuer directly issues cards to consumers and merchants enroll to accept 
the card. In an open system, such as MasterCard and Visa for credit cards and NYCE and 
Pulse for debit cards, cards are issued by the member financial institutions as opposed to 
the card scheme (such as MasterCard) itself.
22
   
The Bank of Finland consumer survey suggests convenience is a major factor 
leading consumers to use payment cards for transactions.
23
  30.6% of respondents indicated 
the most important reason they use card payments is the more troublesome nature of cash 
usage (for example, in needing to take back change at the point of sale), and 9.5% cited the 
troublesomeness of withdrawing cash from ATMs and banks.
24
  According to a 2010 
World Bank survey, almost all developed countries had an average of more than one card 
                                                          
21
 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, What is a Grace Period? How Does it Work? (Mar. 22, 
2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/47/what-is-a-grace-period-how-does-it-work.html. 
22
 MasterCard and Visa both started as an association of card-issuing banks that was owned and funded by 
those banks and acted as the licensor for the respective card brand.  Today, they are both investor-owned, 
standalone companies, but their general role in the payment card landscape remains mostly unchanged.  See 
Marc Rysman & Julian Wright, The Economics of Payment Cards (Nov. 2012). 
23
 See Kari Takala & Matti Viren, Efficiency and Costs of Payments: Some New Evidence from Finland, 
BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS (Nov. 2008), at 20. 
24
 Id. 
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per capita in circulation, reflecting their widespread usage.
25
  In 2012, 51.7 billion and 26.2 
billion transactions were made using debit and credit cards in the United States, 
respectively.
26
 The number of credit card payments, having grown by only 1% annually 
from 2006 to 2009, exhibited annual growth of 6.8% from 2009 to 2012.
27
  Debit card 
payments increased more than any other payment type during this period.
28
 
 
D. Automated Clearing House Transfers 
 Automated Clearing House transfers refer to payments made through an Automated 
Clearing House (ACH), an electronic payment network that connects all financial 
institutions and acts as the central clearing facility for electronic fund transfers that occur 
nationwide.  ACH payments are processed in batch form in the U.S.—transactions are 
accumulated throughout the day and transmitted periodically in groups on a net basis, in 
contrast to real-time gross settlement systems in which funds are transferred transaction-by-
                                                          
25
 See Payment System Worldwide A Snapshot, supra, at 59. 
26
 See Statistics on Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPMI Countries – Figures for 2013, 
supra. 
27
 The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study (July 2014). 
28
 Id. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
2003 2006 2009 2012
Number of Non-Cash Payments (Billions) 
Source: 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study 
Credit Card Debit Card ACH Checks
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transaction on a real-time basis.
29
  In the U.S., the development and administration of the 
ACH network is managed by the National Automated Clearing House Association 
(NACHA), a non-profit association of financial institutions that form part of the network, in 
contrast to networks for debit and credit card transactions, which are maintained and run by 
the respective card association such as MasterCard and Visa.
30
 
ACH transactions are mainly used for recurring preauthorized transactions between 
payors and payees, such as utility bills or monthly salaries.  An ACH transfer can be a debit 
or credit transfer.  In a debit transfer, the payee (e.g. utility firm), through the payee’s bank, 
sends a request to the payor's bank (e.g. utility customer’s bank), with the payor's approval, 
for funds to be removed from the payor's bank account and credited to the payee's account.  
In an ACH credit transfer, a request is made by the payor (e.g. salary provider) for funds to 
be removed from its account and credited to the payee's (e.g. salary recipient) account. 
 Recently, however, a new trend in ACH transactions has developed whereby payors 
can make a one-time authorized payment to the payee without an ongoing recurring 
payment.  Some of the more common recent uses of ACH transfers are point-of-sale 
payments and remote payments over the Internet.
31
  In a typical point-of-sale ACH transfer, 
the payor gives a paper check (or, in the remote payments context, provides the bank 
routing and account numbers found on the check) to the payee, who then uses the check 
information to initiate a one-time ACH debit transfer from the payor's account to the 
                                                          
29
 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, Automated Clearinghouse Services (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedach_about.htm. 
30
 About Us, NACHA – THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, https://www.nacha.org/aboutus. 
31
 Other common forms of one-time ACH transfers, commonly termed “electronic checks” or “e-checks,” 
include an account-receivable conversion (in which the payor's check is used as a source document to make a 
debit transfer to the payee, but not at the point-of-sale) and telephone-initiated transfer (in which the payor 
makes the payment authorization over telephone). 
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payee's account instead of going through the traditional check processing process.  
Similarly to debit and credit card transactions, and in contrast to traditional ACH transfers, 
the payee would not be permitted to draw subsequent funds from the payor's account 
without getting a new authorization.  Point-of-sale ACH transfers, which accounted for 
approximately 204 million transactions in 2003, had risen to 406 million by 2013.
32
  
Internet-initiated ACH transfer saw an even more rapid increase from 689 million 
transactions in 2003 to 3.28 billion transactions in 2013.
33
  Overall, as of 2013, the ACH 
system processed about 17.55 billion transactions per year.
34
 
E.        Virtual or Digital Currencies 
Virtual or digital currencies like Bitcoin are an emerging form of non-governmental 
or “private” money. Such currencies depend on complex encryption techniques and 
dispersed community ledgers to create transferable tokens of exchange.  Since such 
currencies are not backed by the government but are issued by dispersed user communities, 
they fluctuate in value against sovereign currencies, taking on the traits of a speculative 
commodity as well as a medium of exchange.  As of November 2014, the market 
capitalization of Bitcoin stood at approximately $5.77 billion, up from $1.32 billion in May 
2013.
35
  Although their use is to date very limited and circumscribed by legal and 
regulatory uncertainty, they bear watching. Indeed, virtual currencies (of which there are 
                                                          
32
 NACHA – THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, Overall ACH Volume Nearly 22 Billion in 2013 
(2014), https://www.nacha.org/system/files/resources/ACH%20Network%20Statistics%202013.zip; NACHA 
– THE ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, Ten Billion ACH Payments in 2003, NACHA Announces (Mar. 
22, 2004), https://www.nacha.org/node/789. 
33
 Overall ACH Volume Nearly 22 Billion in 2013, supra. 
34
 Id. 
35
 COINDESK, Bitcoin Market Capitalization Chart, (November 13, 2014), 
http://www.coindesk.com/data/bitcoin-market-capitalization/. 
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many) were largely developed to challenge fiat money and the power of government to 
determine its supply and value. 
IV. COASE THEOREM 
The analysis of the economics and regulation of the retail payment system requires 
a consistent framework within which the costs and benefits of different retail payment 
instruments, and the costs and benefits of regulations imposed on them, can be evaluated.   
The Coase Theorem, a proposition pioneered by Ronald Coase in the 1960s in the 
field of law and economics, is helpful in this regard.
36
 In summary, the theorem posits that 
private transactors, in the absence of transaction costs and acting in their best self-interest, 
will tend to reach transactions and asset distribution that maximize their combined private 
welfare.  This is true because if the parties involved can bargain freely, they can simply 
agree to distribute the excess welfare generated in a way that is profitable for both parties.  
That is to say, as long as parties can bargain freely, generating a large pie and dividing it 
between the parties will always be more desirable than generating a small pie and 
redistributing the same, leading the parties to structure their transactions in a way that 
maximizes the size of the pie.  This simple idea has had a large impact on, and forms the 
basis of, modern economic analyses of government regulation. 
One of the central ideas derived from the Coasian reasoning is that government 
regulations are not very effective at helping the parties reach the "optimal" solution, that is, 
one that maximizes the size of the pie from which the parties can bargain to obtain their 
share.  This is because government regulations are often simply redistributive in nature, 
                                                          
36
 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (1960). 
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mandating the method by which the generated pie should be shared, and do not necessarily 
favorably alter the fundamental underlying economic nature of the transaction.  Further, 
mandated distribution not in line with the will of the parties could cause the parties to 
produce smaller pies, or less joint welfare. 
Another important idea derived from the Coase Theorem is the critical importance 
of transaction costs, that is, the cost of entering into and executing a transaction.  
Transaction cost includes the direct cost of performing a transaction.  For example, survey 
and conveyance fees that must be paid in a real estate transaction are direct transaction 
costs.  More subtly but perhaps more importantly, transaction costs also include those costs 
that arise primarily from the asymmetry of knowledge between the transacting parties.  
Continuing with the real estate example, the purchaser in the transaction may incur 
significant costs in investigating possible defects or encumbrances on the real estate 
property that are known but undisclosed by the seller.  The cost involved in the 
investigation is a transaction cost that arises from the asymmetry of information between 
the buyer and the seller, which would not be incurred if the parties had the same knowledge.  
When the asymmetry of information and the cost of resolving the asymmetry are 
sufficiently great, parties may decide not to transact at all even when there is a potential 
mutual benefit to be had from the transaction, representing lost value. 
In the context of the retail payment system, the two classes of costs, the direct costs 
and the information asymmetry costs, are manifested in various ways.  Direct costs of retail 
payment instruments to transacting parties may include the cost of creating the physical 
payment instruments such as coins, banknotes, checks, and payment cards, and the cost of 
-17- 
 
 
 
processing those payments, including counting cash, clearing checks, and processing card 
payments.  The information asymmetry costs may include the cost involved in investigating 
the validity of a payment and the creditworthiness of the payor if goods are to be exchanged 
immediately for a payment that may not be completed until later, as is usually the case with 
checks and ACH transfers.  Features of different retail payment instruments can mitigate or 
exacerbate these costs to varying degrees.   
 Coase characterized transaction costs as “friction” that added expense to the goods 
and services being bought and sold, not value.
37
  His theory of the firm maintains that 
business organizations exist to reduce friction that exists in market contracting, but also 
create their own friction.  However, in the payment context, payment systems do not 
merely add costs to the expense of goods and services, since without efficient payment 
mechanisms, the optimal amount of exchange of goods and services will not occur. 
 It is useful to break down Coase’s transaction cost categories into sub-components 
subject to measurement.  An expanded set of transaction costs for market contracting 
between two firms would include, among other things: 
1. Cost of Counterparty Discovery   
2. Cost of Price Discovery   
3. Cost of Negotiation 
4. Cost of Fulfillment  
5. Cost of Financial Settlement  
6. Cost of Counterparty Default Risk  
                                                          
37
 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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a. Counterparty Monitoring Costs 
b. Contract Enforcement Costs 
c. Cost of Contract Replacement 
d. Costs of Collection 
7. Cost of Internal Control 
8. Cost of Fraud and Theft 
9. Cost of Asset Management  
10. Cost of Working Capital 
11. Cost of Third Party Liability 
 Digital technology has been widely deployed to lower these costs, essentially 
through improved information logistics between and within the counterparties, often 
integrated with physical logistics.  
An important lesson of the Coase Theorem is that the government should regulate to 
reduce the transaction costs that may prevent parties from reaching efficient and mutually 
beneficial outcomes, rather than acting in a redistributive role by defining the division of 
generated value among transaction participants.  In other words, an efficient regulation 
would be one that tends to reduce direct transaction costs, particularly the information 
asymmetry among the parties.  Furthermore, while costs in some way could be thought of 
as accruing to one party or the other in a transaction, the regulatory focus should be on the 
minimization of combined total transaction cost for the parties.  As long as a payment 
system is an efficient one, parties (consumers and merchants) will find their own 
redistributive mechanisms to reach a cost and welfare-sharing scheme that is acceptable to 
-19- 
 
 
 
both parties.  Indeed, attempts by the government to redistribute costs are often nullified by 
further reactive measures by the parties.  Nyberg (2008)
38
 gives an example of this idea 
where, despite a payment system regulation seeming to impose costs on merchants and 
banks, a large portion of the cost was ultimately borne by consumers through increased fees.  
This has played out in practice following the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
with banks responding to the mandated reduction in interchange fees by increasing other 
bank fees and reducing access to fee-free accounts.
39
 
V. OVERALL COST OF PAYMENT 
 Almost all retail payments (except transfers between accounts owned by the same 
entity) serve to settle or discharge a formal or implied market contract between two entities 
(gifts, for example, would be an exception). For example, a payment in response to an 
invoice settles the market contract for a purchase of goods and services, swiping a credit 
card creates a contractual obligation to pay the issuing bank which must be settled, and 
handing over a dollar bill in exchange for a newspaper settles an implied contract instantly 
with finality. 
 All market contracts are to a degree asymmetrical or incomplete in terms of the 
information or bargaining power of the counterparties. When a merchant hands over goods 
in return for cash, for example, the customer bears the risk of defective goods and the 
merchant bears the risk of counterfeit currency. In many cases these asymmetrical risks can 
be substantial, for example, when accepting checks for large value purchases, or shipping 
                                                          
38
 See Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, Speech at the Finansförbund Congress, 
Bålsta (May 23, 2008). 
39
 See Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A Manne & Julian Morris, Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange 
Fees: The U.S. Experience (George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 14-18, June 4, 2014). 
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goods in advance of payment as is normal commercial practice in business-to-business 
commerce.  
 When a payment balances the interests and reduces the risks undertaken by 
counterparties to a market contract, it reduces the total cost of contracting along one or 
more of the dimensions listed out above. In so doing, in Coasian terms the payment system, 
by reducing transaction costs, increases the scope for market contracting between parties.  
For this reason, the notion that the total cost of the payment system is frictional waste to the 
economy and a misallocation of societal resources is fallacious, because it assumes that a 
payment is a payment without regard to the manner in which a payment reduces or 
increases the total transaction costs and the volume of contracts (which is to say commerce) 
it facilitates.  The fallacy leads directly to the notion that cheaper payments are better by 
definition and further that public policy should act to reduce the cost of using specific 
payment instruments.  
 This broad misunderstanding has become the basis of public policy orthodoxy in 
payments systems, often with spillovers into concerns like financial inclusion and 
economic development.  The assumption is that the costs of the payment system are a 
“market failure” that needs to be corrected by regulatory intervention or direct government 
investment. This, of course, assumes that a payment system is fundamentally a utility or 
public infrastructure like a power grid rather than a means to an end of better fulfillment of 
contractual objectives.  So mere comparisons of costs of payments are incomplete unless 
such costs are judged against the benefits they produce. 
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The cost of payment refers to the fact that payment systems, the retail payment 
system especially, are services with real production costs, both direct and indirect.  Direct 
costs of retail payment include the cost associated with verifying and clearing various 
payment instruments and the cost of infrastructure such as point-of-sale terminals and 
computer systems necessary to process electronic payment transactions.  Indirect costs 
include expected losses from fraudulent payment instruments such as counterfeit cash and 
fake credit cards, and the implicit cost of holding non-interest bearing cash.  It is these 
indirect costs which are crucial. 
Different payment systems have different cost components.  For example, the Bank 
of Finland's 2008 report identifies several factors that contribute to the cost of cash.
40
  For 
the purpose of that study, the authors consider the cost of cash as accruing to four separate, 
identifiable parties: the central bank, the banking sector, merchants, and consumers.  The 
cost of cash to the central bank includes procurement of new banknotes and coins, 
transportation of cash between central bank branches, issuing, sorting, and destroying unfit 
banknotes, vault and storage, and other miscellaneous costs such as real estate, IT services, 
and security.  The cost of cash to the banking sector includes transportation of cash, the cost 
of procuring and operating ATMs, and back office functions to count, sort, and process 
cash, among others.  The retail sector's cost of cash includes the cost of deposit and 
withdrawal, point-of-sale cashier operation, back office functions, storage, transportation, 
and security.  Finally, consumers incur costs from fees paid on withdrawal of cash, personal 
                                                          
40
 See Takala & Viren, supra, at 25 et seq. 
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effort of using cash (for example, time spent withdrawing and depositing cash), and 
seigniorage, that is, implicit loss of interest income from holding non-interest bearing cash. 
Many efforts have been made to estimate the actual cost of various components of 
the retail payment system.  However, due to the difficulties in adequately estimating the 
various costs involved, studies are typically inconclusive and incomplete.  For example, 
Shampine (2007)
41
 criticizes the study by Garcia-Swartz et al. (2005),
42
 which 
quantitatively estimates the cost of various retail payment instruments, as non-robust and 
open to challenges surrounding the underlying assumptions.  Shampine points out that 
Garcia-Swartz et al. disregard the cost of interest payments made by credit card users from 
their analysis, despite the fact that 54% of cardholders carry a credit card balance.  
Shampine also suggests that the study overemphasizes the cost of making an ATM trip to 
retrieve cash, and underestimates the consumers' valuation of privacy.  Much of the 
difficulty of measuring payment system cost comes from the fact that some necessary data 
are proprietary and therefore difficult to obtain, such as the cost of banking operations, and 
because some costs are inherently difficult to quantify, such as the cost of personal efforts 
in using cash. 
Studies have also been done to estimate the relative cost of each payment method 
within a country.  Brits and Winder (2005)
43
 estimate the costs of retail payment 
instruments, and find that cash (7 billion transactions), debit cards (1 billion transactions), 
                                                          
41
 See Allan Shampine, Another Look at Payment Instrument Economics, 6 REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS 
4 (2007). 
42
 See Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, Robert W. Hahn, & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Move Toward a Cashless 
Society: A Closer Look at Payment Instrument Economics, 5 REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS 1 (2006). 
43
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and credit cards (46 million transactions) cost a total of €2.122 billion, €520 million, and 
€165 million in the Netherlands, respectively. Guiborg and Segendorf (2004) estimate the 
unit cost of check (20.02 SEK), debit card (0.65 SEK), and credit card (3.46 SEK) 
payments in Sweden.
44
 
Despite the difficulties with cost estimates, two facts seem relatively clear. 
First, significant differences exist between countries in the total cost of the retail 
payment system as a percentage of GDP.  A 2012 study by the European Central Bank 
divides EU member states into clusters, ranked by the cost of retail payments as a 
percentage of GDP.
45
  The study finds that Denmark, Sweden, and Finland have the lowest 
cost of retail payments, at an average of 0.80% of GDP, whereas countries such as Cyprus, 
Malta, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and France incur higher cost in their retail payments, at an 
average of 1.20% of the GDP in each country.  The lower cost in the first cluster seems 
largely attributable to the greater reliance on electronic payment methods.  The cost of the 
payment system is higher in the United States.  Humphrey et al. (2000)
 46
 estimate the total 
cost of the payment system to be over $225 billion in the United States, comprising 
approximately 2-3 percent of GDP.  Banka et al. (2012) estimate the total cost of the paper-
based payment system in the United States (including coins, paper currency, and paper 
                                                          
44
 Gabriela Guibourg & Björn Segendorf, Do Prices Reflect Costs? A Study of the Price- and Cost Structure 
of Retail Payment Services in the Swedish Banking Sector 2002 (2004). 
45
 See Heiko Schmiedel, Gergana Kostova, & Wiebe Ruttenberg, The Social and Private Costs of Retail 
Payment Instruments: A European Perspective (Sept. 2012), at 41. 
46
 See David Humphrey, Lawrence Pulley & Jukka Vesala, The Check’s in the Mail: Why the United States 
Lags in the Adoption of Cost-Saving Electronic Payments, 17 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH 
17 (2000). 
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checks) in 2010 at $506 billion, corresponding to 3.5% of the country’s 2010 GDP.47 A 
Fletcher School study (2012) estimates the cost of cash in the United States to be 
approximately $200 billion.
48
 The high cost of payment in the United States is probably 
explained by the historic patterns of payment preferences, notably the continued use of 
checks to a much greater extent than in other countries.
49
  
 Second, the cost of using a retail payment instrument depends largely on the 
transaction amounts involved.  Studies find that cash payments are relatively cheap for 
small transaction amounts, whereas debit and credit cards are much more efficient payment 
methods for larger transaction amounts.  For example, Arango and Taylor (2008)
50
 find that 
cash is the cheapest payment method for transactions of very small value in Canada, while 
debit cards on average are the least costly throughout a broader cross-section of 
transactions including higher value transactions.  This is driven by the variable costs of 
cash, including the labor costs of tendering and depositing cash and the risks of cash theft 
or counterfeit loss, which increase significantly for large transaction amounts.  Arango and 
Taylor also suggest that smaller merchants may perceive cash as less costly than other 
forms of payments because of the relatively high fixed cost, due to necessary infrastructure, 
associated with receiving electronic payments. 
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 Holti Banka et al., From Cash to Electronic Payments: Quantifying and Measuring the Costs of Paper 
Based Payment Instruments to the U.S. Society (Apr. 2012). 
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 CENTER FOR EMERGING MARKET ENTERPRISES, Cost of Cash in the United States (2012). 
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VI. RETAIL PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS AND IMPORTANT TRANSACTION 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 As discussed above, the “utility” or “public infrastructure” view of the payments 
system ignores the often disparate interests of the two contracting counterparties and how 
well they are accommodated by specific payment instruments and modalities. These 
interests, independent of costs, include: (1) finality and reversibility;  (2) universality 
(ability to use at point of sale and remotely); (3) recordkeeping; (4) liquidity (maximizing 
interest earning assets); (5) security and safety; (6) financial inclusion and access; and (7) 
fungibility and ease of use.  The real cost of a payment system must be judged by how the 
form of payment achieves the objectives of parties with respect to these issues. 
 Some of these characteristics are in the interests of all parties, like security and ease 
of use, but many involve conflicting interests of the parties. For example, finality favors 
sellers while reversibility (or stop payment) favors buyers.  Recordkeeping may be sought 
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by some but others may prefer anonymity.  Remote commerce may increase the ease of 
purchase but it also requires the use of the Internet and cellular infrastructure which have 
security vulnerabilities. 
 Using existing literature, this section evaluates the most common retail payment 
instruments—checks, payment cards, and ACH transfers (and cash) against these 
characteristics and arrives at the conclusion that payment cards have considerable 
advantages to the counterparties using them, over and above mere cost.  Cash is used as the 
benchmark of comparison when looking at non-cash payment instruments. 
A. Payment Finality and Reversibility 
 Payment finality refers to the property of a payment that through its performance 
permanently discharges the payor from further debt or obligation, and which cannot later be 
revoked.  This occurs, for example, in cash but not check payments.  Kahn and Roberds 
(2002)
51
 discuss the economics of payment finality and the critical importance of its role in 
modern society.  Finality gives assurance to the payor that once payment is made, he will 
not be subject to further liabilities or obligations.  Similarly, it gives assurance to the payee 
that she can rely on the validity of the payment when performing her part of the bargain, 
such as turning over or shipping of goods or performance of a service.  Non-final payments 
create a credit risk to the payee, that is, the risk that the payor will not in fact end up 
honoring his obligation to pay. 
 Payment or transaction reversibility is a related and somewhat opposite property 
that allows the payment made to be reversed, typically through the action of the payor or 
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the financial intermediary processing the payment in question.  There are two primary 
situations where reversal of payment may be desirable.  First, if there is a fraud, mistake, or 
other failure to perform on the part of the payee, such as delivery of the wrong or defective 
products, the payor will rightly want his payment to be reversed.  Second, when a 
transaction is initiated by an unauthorized third party in the name of the payor, such as in 
the case of identity theft and credit card fraud, the unwitting payor will also want a 
mechanism by which the payment could be reversed.  Finality and reversibility, while each 
desirable in its own right, are opposite features of a payment system.  Drawing on Coase, 
the parties would strike a balance between these two properties that would maximize joint-
welfare.  In the absence of the ability to bargain, due to a large number of parties and the 
high cost of bargaining, law and regulation should seek to strike the balance that the parties 
would reach absent the transaction costs of bargaining.   
1. Cash 
 Cash can be considered the most final of all payment methods; there is typically no 
legal means of reversing a cash transaction without resorting to the courts and litigation.  A 
purchaser paying for his purchase with cash takes the risk that the payee may not have 
honored his promises, for example by delivering defective goods, in which case the 
recovery of his payment may be impossible or prohibitively expensive.   
 
 
 
 
-28- 
 
 
 
2. Checks 
Checks, in contrast, are one of the least final of retail payment methods.  For basic 
checks,
52
 the payor can typically put a stop on the completion of the payment by instructing 
his bank, even after the check is transferred to the payee but before the check is debited to 
his account, to refuse to honor his instruction.  The payor may do so to defraud the payee, 
even when the goods he received are perfectly acceptable.  This ability to stop payment 
gives rise to a risk to the payee of eventual nonpayment; it also creates an incentive to 
collect on the check quickly.  However, the picture is reversed once the fund transfer is 
completed.  Under normal legal rules, the payor has no recourse once the fund transfer from 
the payor’s account to the payee's account is completed by the debiting of the payor’s 
account.
53
  This normal legal rule could be altered by changing the law to make checks 
reversible for some period even after they are delivered, as there is nothing inherent in the 
check instrument to prevent this,
54
 but this has never been done in practice.   
 The end result of U.S. check rules is that checks offer very little in the way of 
finality or reversibility.  Payees are always at the risk that a dishonest payor could, for 
example, engage in check fraud, in which the payor withdraws funds from his account 
before the check is paid, or uses checks written on an account without sufficient funds to 
                                                          
52
 Exceptions are the types of checks where the bank guarantees the validity of the check at the time it is 
written by setting aside an amount from the payor's account, as is the case with certified checks. 
53
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cover them.  Payors, on the other hand, chance that dishonest payees can obtain funds 
without fulfilling their contracts, particularly if a contract stipulates that the check must 
clear before the seller will ship the good.  Since the dishonest party in each situation is 
almost always the party with greater information, check usage heightens the cost of 
information asymmetry, with parties possibly incurring additional costs to investigate the 
credibility of the counterparty and the product in question.   
3. Payment Cards 
 Debit and credit cards afford a degree of consumer protection through reversibility 
of payment, to some extent as a result of private rules of card associations and to some 
extent as a result of law.  Credit cards typically allow for a period of time during which a 
consumer can contest or reverse a transaction, after which the transaction becomes final and 
the card issuer, rather than the merchant, bears the risk of nonpayment by the consumer.  
The primary law governing debit card transactions in the United States is the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act and the Consumer Financial Protection Board's implementing regulation, 
commonly known as Regulation E.
55
  Regulation E requires financial institutions to notify 
consumers in cases of adverse changes in fees or liabilities to consumers,
56
 creates a 
framework of preauthorized transfers and error resolution,
57
 limits consumer liability for 
unauthorized transfers
58
 and provides protections to consumers in relation to payments 
made to overseas counterparties.
59
  Credit cards are regulated through the Consumer 
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 The Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 et seq.; 12 C.F.R. § 1005 et seq. In force from 28 
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Financial Protection Bureau's Regulation Z, implementing the Truth in Lending Act and its 
subsequent amendments, in particular the Credit CARD Act of 2009.
60
  Similar to 
Regulation E, Regulation Z contains general disclosure requirements
61
 and provisions 
providing billing error resolution procedures and consumer liability limits.
62
  The error 
resolution and unauthorized use provisions of Regulations E and Z provide a degree of 
reversibility.  Card associations such as MasterCard and Visa have their own rules that 
apply to issuing and acquiring member banks in their network,
63
 and these rules often 
provide additional consumer protection in addition to the baseline minimum set by legal 
rules.
64
 
Consumers are not the only beneficiaries of these protective measures.  Merchants 
benefit from these measures because some risk-averse consumers would not enter into a 
transaction without the possibility of reversal.  Naturally, this right could be abused—a 
consumer could claim the goods are defective when they are not.  To avoid misuse of the 
right, card issuers undertake the obligation to investigate and resolve reversal disputes 
between consumers and merchants.  This, of course, adds an additional cost to this payment 
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 The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601 note; 12 C.F.R. § 1026 subpart B. 
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mechanism.  We have not examined whether the chargeback rules for credit cards (or other 
payments) reach the optimal solution in Coasian terms.   
4. ACH Transfers 
 The finality and reversibility of ACH transfers flow from the legal rules governing 
the ACH system and from its nature as a net-basis, batch processing system.  ACH transfers, 
similar to debit cards, are governed by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau’s Regulation E, in addition to applicable NACHA rules.  ACH 
transfers tend to offer a greater degree of finality and less reversibility than credit and debit 
cards.  The NACHA rule governing ACH transfers, for example, recognizes only three 
reasons for which consumers can dispute ACH charges to their account: lack of transfer 
authorization, transfer occurring earlier than authorized, and transfer for an amount 
different than authorized.
65
  Furthermore, the receiving bank does not have any obligation 
to initiate a reversal if the reversal would cause the payee’s account at the receiving bank to 
be overdrawn or if the account does not exist anymore.
66
  This procedural difficulty makes 
it more difficult for consumers to reverse payments, compared to card payments in which 
payments can be unilaterally reversed with minimal documentation or proof, and thus 
ensures a greater degree of finality for the payee. 
 Net-basis batch settlement, a major distinguishing feature of ACH transfers, has a 
further finality implication for parties involved.  Under current Federal Reserve policy, 
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ACH forward credit items
67
 processed by the Federal Reserve only become final at 8:30 
A.M. ET on the day following the transaction request.
68
  The Federal Reserve has the right 
to reverse payments until the payment becomes final, which may make ACH payments 
undesirable for highly time-sensitive payments in which parties desire immediate finality. 
      5.  Virtual or Digital Currencies     
Bitcoin and other digital currencies are based on account entries, i.e. ledger money 
systems, so in principle they could allow for the reversal of transactions.  However, unlike 
other ledger money systems, like cards or wire transfers, there is no rulebook or legal 
authority to determine the rights and obligations of the parties, particularly in relation to 
reversibility and finality.  Lack of such a legal framework is a general problem with digital 
currencies.  Taking Bitcoin as an example, the irreversibility of payments creates 
heightened transaction risk for consumers, who are at the mercy of payees in the event of 
an accidental or unwanted payment due to the lack of a mechanism to forcefully retake 
funds.
69
 
B. Universality: Electronic and Remote Commerce 
Ever since its emergence in the early 2000s, retail electronic commerce (which by 
its very nature involves remote commerce) has been gradually accounting for a greater 
percentage of retail sales every year.  In 2012, U.S. retail e-commerce spending was 
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estimated at $343.43 billion dollars, a 14% increase from the $301.69 billion in 2011.
70
  
Consumers mention low prices, convenience, and ease of comparison among multiple 
products as some of the reasons why they prefer online purchases. 
 The role of the payment system in enabling and facilitating electronic commerce is 
critical.  Indeed, remote transactions involved in electronic commerce simply cannot occur 
without a reliable payment method that meets the needs of both the buyer and the seller.  In 
particular, due to the inherent risk to the buyer in making a purchase online without 
inspecting the good to be purchased, buyers want the consumer protection, e.g. reversibility, 
afforded by some but not other retail payment instruments.  Oxley and Yeung (2001)
71
 
identify the existence of credible and reliable payment systems, in addition to the rule of 
law governing electronic commerce, as a prime factor that enables electronic commerce.  
Sorkin (2001)
72
 finds that consumers engaging in online auctions favor online payment 
systems, in contrast to traditional payment methods such as personal checks, mainly for 
reasons of speed and convenience, with relatively little consideration for other factors such 
as product quality risk or risk of financial information theft.   
 1. Cash 
 Cash is inherently unsuitable for remote transactions.  The physical nature of the 
currency requires that for remote transactions, cash must be transmitted by mail or other 
means.  This is costly in terms of time and expense, and risky in that cash transmitted by 
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mail could be lost or stolen.  Furthermore, an unwitting buyer who sends cash by mail 
would have a difficult time proving that cash was sent when a dishonest seller claims 
ignorance of its receipt.  Cash on delivery, where the purchaser pays cash to the delivery 
agent at the time of delivery of a remotely purchased product, is cumbersome and does not 
seem to be favored by most consumers or retailers.
73
   
 2. Checks 
 Checks share many characteristics with cash in the context of remote transactions 
and are likewise an unsuitable form of payment in most cases.  The payor would have to 
transmit the check physically to the payee, which is often costly and time-consuming.  
Often online purchasers want to receive their merchandise as soon as possible—waiting for 
checks to be sent and cleared would delay the process substantially.  Checks offer an 
advantage over cash in that the processing of the check leaves a verifiable record, which 
prevents the payee from denying the receipt of payment and makes checks less vulnerable 
to theft in transmission than cash.  Nonetheless, checks incur significant transaction costs 
when used as a payment mechanism between remote parties. 
 3. Payment Cards 
 Payment cards are the norm in remote transactions.
74
 With payment cards, payors 
enter the card number with authenticating information and submit it to the payee over the 
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Internet, which causes the transfer of funds from the buyer's bank through the payment 
network and other intermediaries to the payee's bank account.  The exceptional 
convenience of using payment cards to make purchases online means that the transaction 
cost barrier of such transactions has been substantially reduced to the benefit of all parties.  
The lack of the need to transfer any physical instrument for the payment allows a purchase 
to be made quickly and conveniently, which is one of the main advantages offered by 
online transactions as opposed to purchases in a traditional store.   
Furthermore, the consumer protection measures offered by payment cards, as 
previously discussed, are particularly desirable in the context of remote transactions, where 
the quality of the product or the trustworthiness of the vendor cannot be easily ascertained 
by the buyer before making the purchase. This is particularly significant given that goods 
are delivered after the payment is made and the consumer's account is charged in virtually 
all cases of Internet merchandise transactions.   
4. ACH Transfers 
ACH transfers have played an important part in remote transactions throughout the 
history of the ACH system.  Payment of recurring bills from a remote provider has always 
been an important function of ACH transfer.  Recent innovations such as Internet-based 
ACH transfer have increased the applicability of this form of payment, and today, web-
based merchants frequently accept payments in the form of ACH transfers in addition to 
debit and credit cards. 
 While a convenient way of making remote payments, ACH transfers suffer from a 
weaker consumer protection compared to credit and debit cards, which is particularly 
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relevant in online transactions in which the information asymmetry problem is especially 
severe.   There does not appear to be any inherent technological limitation on the ACH 
system that would prevent the law from affording a degree of consumer protection 
equivalent to credit and debit cards, but this is a policy decision that must be made after 
considering the costs and benefits to the parties involved. 
             5.  Virtual or Digital Currencies 
             Bitcoin or other digital currencies can be used for transactions between parties 
anywhere on earth provided they accept them as payment.  This global and relatively 
frictionless transfer of value capability is a logical extension of virtual commerce, but 
carries with it risks of cybercrime and illicit financial activities. 
C. Transaction Recordkeeping 
 Recordkeeping is the practice of maintaining records of an organization, particularly 
of financial events.  Having a comprehensive financial record allows businesses to obtain a 
detailed knowledge of the operation of the business, including costs.  In addition, retaining 
transactional and financial records facilitates detection of fraud or theft.  In many cases, 
recordkeeping is required for corporate law compliance, taxation, and accounting purposes, 
particularly in the wake of the increased recordkeeping requirements under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the United States.  Recordkeeping is also important to consumers with respect 
to budgeting and tax planning, but the principal focus here is on businesses. 
   Recordkeeping is not free.  Business owners must spend time and resources on 
obtaining computer hardware and software, and on training employees in their use.  There 
is also an implicit cost of creating records, since they may inadvertently come into the 
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hands of competitors or government authorities.  Thus, businesses spend millions of dollars 
every year in an effort to make their records secure and only available to intended parties.  
An efficient retail payment system will allow businesses to minimize the costs involved in 
recordkeeping while maximizing the benefit gained.  This could be accomplished, for 
example, by obviating or lessening the need to train employees in recordkeeping skills or to 
spend funds on security.   This aspect of a payment system has little to do with law or 
regulation, or even contract—the recordkeeping potential of a payment system is largely 
determined by the inherent nature of the form of payment itself. 
1. Cash 
 Cash transactions present several difficulties in the way of transaction 
recordkeeping.  Cash must be counted and transaction amounts recorded manually, which 
may give rise to frequent errors and may take a substantial amount of time.  This also 
allows dishonest employees to create fraudulent records, which may record revenue at less 
than its actual value while the employee pockets the difference.  Furthermore, the cash 
method of accounting, which records revenue when cash is received or paid, often does not 
comply with accrual-based accounting rules required of public companies in most 
jurisdictions, making it necessary for the companies to prepare costly reconciliatory 
statements.   
For consumers trying to manage their budget and control their expenses, cash is 
inherently disadvantageous.  It has a limited recordkeeping function since it leaves no trace 
of payment.  However, cash's anonymity and lack of audit trail can be an advantage as well, 
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since the consumer is not obliged to divulge his financial information, which could increase 
the chance of identity theft or unauthorized access to his account. 
2. Checks 
 Checks offer some advantage over cash for the purposes of recordkeeping.  They 
leave a paper trail, which both facilitates recording of transactions and makes it more 
difficult to falsify records.  However, checks still usually require businesses to manually 
enter the transactions into their books, exposing them to the possibility of errors or 
omissions. 
 3. Payment Cards 
 Payment cards offer unique advantages in facilitating recordkeeping compared to 
cash.  Due to the nature of electronic payments, all transactions processed are recorded in 
the system, which facilitates the accurate and real-time recording of transactions.  
Furthermore, use of debit and credit cards can tie each transaction to a particular customer, 
such that valuable marketing information on customer tendency and preference can be 
compiled.
75
  
With electronic payments, there is some risk that business records that reside with 
third party processors are less secure than if the record stayed exclusively within the 
business.  But almost all payments other than cash involve third party processing; perhaps 
the issue is the ease of obtaining electronic rather than paper records.  Whether the 
increased cost of the risk of sharing the financial information is enough to deter businesses 
from using payment cards is an empirical question that can only be answered by 
                                                          
75
 Naturally, the flip side of this is that privacy-conscious consumers suffer and are less likely to use these 
payment options. 
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quantitative studies.  However, the popularity of electronic payment options, including 
payment cards, among consumers and businesses would suggest that the potential privacy 
or information theft concern is at least not great enough to completely deter the use of these 
payment options in most cases.   
Similarly, for consumers, privacy implications of retail payments can be a 
significant consideration. For example, concerns over privacy motivated some private 
parties to create alternative currency addressing this issue, most notably Bitcoin, which 
employs principles of computer cryptography to enable transfer between parties 
electronically without leaving a traceable transaction record.  
4. ACH Transfers 
In almost all relevant recordkeeping aspects, ACH transfers are very similar to 
payment cards as a form of electronic payment.  Financial institutions providing ACH 
transfer services retain a record of transactions, which are accessible by their customers and 
potentially the government. 
5.       Virtual or Digital Currencies  
Digital currencies like Bitcoin exist only as digital information, so they should in 
principle support record keeping.  However, record keeping is decentralized and 
community based, so transactions are extremely difficult to track by design. Indeed, the 
decentralized ledger has been cited as a key innovation of digital currencies in that it allows 
payments directly between payor and payee, eliminating the credit risk, liquidity risk, and 
operational risk posed by the intermediary banks and central bank in a centralized ledger 
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system.
76
  Anonymity is a claimed feature rather than a fault in these schemes, making their 
use in illegal transactions highly attractive, as the notorious Silk Road drug marketplace 
amply demonstrated. 
D. Excess Liquidity and Maximization of Interest-Bearing Assets 
 Liquidity is the ability of an asset to be used immediately and without delay to 
perform basic economic activities such as purchases of products and services and 
repayment of debt.  On the one hand, every consumer and household must maintain a 
certain minimum level of liquidity in order to meet their immediate financial obligations.  
On the other hand, excess maintenance of non-interest bearing liquidity imposes an implicit 
foregone interest cost. Minimization of non-interest bearing assets is also an important 
consideration for businesses.  Merchants want to minimize the time between the customer's 
payment and the availability of the funds as interest-bearing assets or working capital in the 
merchant's own business.  This aspect of the payment system has more to do with the way a 
payment is made than any law or regulation, or even contract.  
1. Cash 
Cash, as the most liquid asset, provides the means necessary for consumers to make 
daily payments.  Cash in the pocket, however, is a non-interest bearing asset, and an 
excessive level of cash holding is costly in terms of foregone interest.  Similarly, when 
businesses accept cash, cash in the cash register cannot be considered a productive asset 
until deposited and credited to the merchant's bank account.  
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 See Robleh Ali, John Barrdear, Roger Clews, and James Southgate, Innovations in Payment Technologies 
and the Emergence of Digital Currencies, BANK OF ENGLAND QUARTERLY BULLETIN, 2014 Q3. 
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 2. Checks 
 Checks would not seem to offer significant advantages in managing liquidity.  
Given the low acceptability of checks in everyday transactions, they cannot be used as 
replacement for cash in meeting daily obligations.  Further, checks are typically drawn 
from liquid checking accounts, which offer very little or no interest, and are in theory 
required to be funded.  For the payee, a check represents a significant delay between when 
the payment instrument is received and when the payee’s account is credited, although 
regulations set maximum limits on time delays for the availability of funds from check 
deposits, and banks typically receive credit on checks within one or two days following 
deposit.
77
  In practice, delays in the US check collection system have been used to engineer 
elaborate liquidity management schemes in which corporate payors seek to maximize mail 
and clearing delays and corporate payees seek to minimize them.  Recently the number of 
checks deposited as electronic images by payees has grown, and interbank clearing of 
checks has become virtually 100 percent electronic,
 78
 both of which will likely reduce the 
delays inherent in check payments. 
3. Payment Cards 
Debit and credit cards have different implications in the management of liquidity.  
Debit cards usually access funds from low-interest checking accounts, and thus are not 
generally a favorable choice for maximization of productive assets, since funds must be 
placed in the checking account to support the debit card activity.  Debit cards that access 
                                                          
77
 See THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, Corporate Compliance Handbook, Regulation CC, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/efaa.pdf. 
78
 The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study (July 2014). 
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funds from savings or money market fund accounts would seem to be more attractive, 
where the assets earn interest and can be withdrawn at a moment’s notice.  However, 
restrictions are typically placed on such accounts.  To be used as transaction accounts, such 
arrangements typically require a large minimum account balance and significant fees.  In 
the United States, regulatory reserve requirements
79
 generally limit the number of 
combined withdrawals and outgoing transfers to six per month for non-checking debit 
accounts in depository institutions.  Occasionally, non-depository money market mutual 
funds offer debit cards linked to the customer's investment account, which are not directly 
regulated in terms of usage but still require significant minimum investment balances.
80
 
Credit cards can obviate the need for individuals to hold large amounts of liquidity.  
The effect of credit cards on liquidity management has been widely studied.  Chakravorti 
and Emmons (2001)
81
 link the payment function of credit cards to the implicit liquidity 
function for liquidity-constrained consumers. Telyukova (2011)
82
 looks at the "credit debt 
puzzle," an empirical observation that households incur high-interest credit card debt while 
having deposit money in a bank checking account.  The study suggests that despite the high 
credit card interest rates, the precautionary demand for liquidity largely explains why many 
households prefer to use their credit cards for daily spending. Chakravorti and To (2006) 
                                                          
79
 12 C.F.R. § 204 et seq.; § 209 et seq. The regulation is commonly known as Regulation D. 
80
 For example, in the United States, American Century Investments offers Visa debit card access to money 
market fund investors with a $10,000 minimum investment. In South Africa, Sanlam offers a similar debit 
card linked to its money market fund investments. 
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 See Sujit Chakravorti & William R. Emmons, Who Pays for Credit Cards (Feb. 2001). 
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 See Irina A. Telyukova, Household Need for Liquidity and the Credit Card Debt Puzzle (Oct. 9, 2012). 
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point out that merchants benefit from this function of credit cards because they can make 
sales to illiquid customers who would otherwise not be able to make the purchase.
83
 
4. ACH Transfers 
ACH transfers are similar to debit card transactions in terms of liquidity 
management.  Transfers are typically made from the payor's checking account, but other 
types of accounts, such as a savings account, could be used, in which case an ACH transfer 
would count against the six transfer limit imposed by Regulation D.  A notable difference 
between ACH transfers and some card transactions, from the perspective of the payee, is 
the inherent delay with which payment occurs.  All ACH transactions are batched, whereas 
some card transactions occur at the time of the transaction.  Delays in payment lower the 
interest-bearing assets in the payee's account. 
However, the automated nature of many ACH transactions means that fund transfers 
can occur quickly and reliably on a periodic basis.  Businesses such as insurance companies 
and utilities benefit from the ability to make monthly transfers from a customer's account 
with preauthorization, ensuring a swift and reliable cash flow.  Consumers, on the other 
hand, benefit from the speed with which they can receive paychecks and government 
benefits through direct deposit (i.e. an ACH credit transfer) as opposed to the traditional 
paper checks.  There is evidence that the exposure to the ACH system through direct 
deposit affects the probability that consumers will use ACH payments in other contexts as 
well.  A study by Hayashi and Klee (2003) find that the fact that a consumer is receiving a 
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direct deposit represents a 21 to 24 percentage point increase in the probability that a 
consumer would use ACH debit transfer to make bill payments.
84
   
5.  Virtual or Digital Currencies 
Digital currencies are difficult to invest without conversion into conventional 
money because of the limited number of assets denominated in such currencies.  On the 
other hand, the holder of a digital currency can speculate on the value of the digital 
currency in terms of other sovereign currencies. Tax authorities in the US have recently 
deemed Bitcoins property subject to capital gains treatment rather than a currency, in itself 
representing a material recordkeeping challenge for holders.   
E.    Security and Safety 
 Payment security is one of the primary considerations for all parties in a transaction.  
Both the payor and the payee want to make sure the payment transmitted by the payor 
reliably and safely reaches the intended payee and that the financial information carried 
with the payment stays confidential to the intended parties.  A series of payment system 
breaches in recent years, in which millions of card numbers and other personal information 
have potentially been stolen, has highlighted the importance of payment system integrity 
and safety of financial information, and brought the issue to the public arena.
85
  We have 
already touched on this issue in the discussion of recordkeeping concerns. 
 Security and safety of a payment system is a broad topic that encompasses multiple 
related issues.  One of the most obvious security risks involved in any form of payment 
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 Fumiko Hayashi & Elizabeth Klee, Technology Adoption and Consumer Payments: Evidence from Survey 
Data, 2 REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS 8 (2003). 
85
 See, e.g., Nicole Bullock, Scale of credit card breach revealed. FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012. 
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instrument is fraud.  This includes fraudulent use of payment cards through identity theft 
and use of counterfeit currencies.  Moreover, theft is a risk in carrying or storing any 
payment instrument.  To avoid theft of payments or payment information, substantial 
resources must be spent on security measures.  The Centre for Retail Research estimates the 
global total of shrinkage loss (which primarily consists of employee theft of cash and 
inventory) in the retail industry at $119 billion, which represents approximately 1.45% of 
the revenue in the sector.
86
 Perception of risk plays a great role in people's choice of 
payment instruments.  A 2009 study by the Bank of Canada suggests that perception of risk, 
including the risk of exposing financial information, has a significant impact on the choice 
of payment method used, even at a moderate risk level.
87
  Law and regulation play a major 
role in assigning liability for fraud risk—in part this is due to the difficulty in allocating 
fraud among multiple parties to a payment that may not be in a contractual relation to each 
other outside of the payment relationship itself.  Generally, the law has tried to achieve the 
Coase efficiency objective by allocating fraud loss to the party in the best position to avoid 
and/or absorb the loss, a major objective of tort law in general. 
                                                          
86
 See CENTRE FOR RETAIL RESEARCH, The Global Retail Theft Barometer 2011 (2012), 
http://www.retailresearch.org/grtb_currentsurvey.php. 
87
 The study defines risk broadly to include the possibility of information theft, counterfeiting, loss, rejection 
of payment method by merchants, and any other factor that contributes to the consumers' perception of a 
payment as risky. Carlos Arango & Varya Taylor, The Role of Convenience and Risk in Consumers' Means of 
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1. Cash 
 Cash presents particular challenges in providing security and safety for its user and 
the recipient.  Cash is a uniquely attractive target of theft and robbery, including employee 
theft and embezzlement, as the anonymity and liquidity of cash affords the least risk for the 
perpetrator after the crime (albeit if in large quantities such cash may have to be laundered).  
In addition, cash is subject to counterfeiting, which leads many retail vendors to refuse to 
accept banknotes in large denominations.  Recent technological improvements such as 
digital printing have made banknote counterfeiting cheaper and easier for counterfeiters, 
presenting a concern for consumers and merchants alike.
88
  Banknotes and coins, when lost, 
usually cannot be recovered because they are indistinguishable from one another.  Cash's 
                                                          
88
 See Bill McCleery, Fake Money: Counterfeiters Use Digital Technology to Their Advantage, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 12, 2013. 
13.7 
16.1 
1.7 0.9 2.3 1.8 1.2 1.1 
5.7% 
2.9% 
0.8% 
0.5% 
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Credit Cards Debit and Prepaid
Cards
ACH Check
2012 Unauthorized Transactions (Third-Party Fraud) 
Source: 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study 
# Transactions (million) Value ($ billion) % of Transactions
-47- 
 
 
 
anonymous nature makes it less likely that the finder of cash will return it to the original 
owner, especially without valid proof of ownership, which may be difficult to provide.   
An advantage of cash is that loss of cash involves a precise and limited damage, the 
amount of cash lost, whereas an unknown larger amount could be at risk in situations 
involving check and payment card frauds (although not in the case of payment card fraud 
perpetuated against consumers, who benefit from fraud liability protections in Regulations 
E and Z and from ritual payment network’s “zero liability” policies).  While the amount of 
fraudulent cash transactions and the rate of usage of counterfeit cash are difficult to 
estimate, the U.S. Treasury estimated in 2001 that less than 0.01% of all U.S. currency in 
circulation was counterfeit.
89
  Of course, there is a real cost to constantly upgrading 
currency printing and production to lessen counterfeiting. 
 2. Checks 
 Checks feature unique risks in security and safety.  In particular, checks are 
vulnerable to fraud in several ways, most of which take advantage of the possibility of 
float,
90
 during which a payee can withdraw funds deposited from a check before the payor’s 
account is debited, which could be exploited by a payor who writes a check to himself 
drawn on an account with insufficient funds.  Some common fraud methods include 
deliberate writing of non-sufficient fund checks and its variations.  Check forgery is also a 
typical security concern.
91
 It can involve alteration of a legitimate check, often stolen, to 
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inflate the payment amount or to change the payee.  It can also take the form of a fabricated 
check written on a non-existent account.  The possibility of alteration makes theft or loss of 
check a significant risk to the original owner.  However, checks nonetheless present a much 
less desirable target for thieves and muggers than cash, partly due to the risk of being traced 
upon usage and partly due to the original check owner's ability to put a hold on the check 
upon theft or loss. The American Bankers Association estimated a loss of $648 million 
from check fraud in the United States in 2012.
92
 
 The allocation of risks of unauthorized payment involves complex legal rules, 
primarily governed by Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United 
States.  Under the current law, the general rule of loss allocation is that the payor's bank 
bears the ultimate loss should a fraudulent transfer occur.
93
  For example, if a fraudster 
writes a check on A's account purporting to be authorized by A (perhaps with the forged 
signature of A) and the payee deposits the check to her bank account, A's bank will debit 
the value of the check from A's account and the payee's bank would credit the payee's 
account.  However, once A discovers the fraud, he can demand that his bank re-credit his 
account since he never authorized the transaction.  Thus, A's bank, unless it can recover 
from the fraudster or show negligence on A's part in the fraud, will be required to re-credit 
A's account and bear the ultimate loss under the current legal rules.  The purported payor's 
bank would thus attempt to minimize the losses by verifying the authenticity of checks and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
& WORLD REPORT, May 19, 2008, http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-collar/2008/05/19/how-frank-
abagnale-would-swindle-you. 
92
 AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Banks Stop $13 Billion in Fraud Attempts in 2012 (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.aba.com/Press/Pages/121213DepositAccountFraud.aspx. 
93
 U.C.C. § 3-418(c). 
-49- 
 
 
 
charging a premium to the payor to cover for the expected loss, possibly in the form of a 
reduced interest rate on the purported payor's deposit account.
94
 
3. Payment Cards 
 Fraud is a significant risk for the issuers and payees of card payments, but this risk 
bas largely been eliminated for card users through a combination of consumer protection 
laws and retail payment network polices discussed above.  Whereas losses and thefts of 
cards can be reported for a cancellation and replacement with little repercussion before any 
fraudulent use, or issuers can suspend payments (pending confirmation from the 
cardholder) if they detect an unusual pattern of payments, the risk of fraud in completed 
transactions remains a major concern of issuers and merchants. 
  Credit card security breaches can take several forms.  Skimming is a common 
technique by which the information from a valid credit or debit card is copied, 
unbeknownst to its owner, to another card, by extracting the information from the magnetic 
strip or the chip with a specialized scanner.  A properly created fake card would be a 
duplicate of the original and would allow the fraudster to enter into transactions as if he 
were the cardholder.  Perpetrators may also attempt to generate valid credit card numbers 
(including expiry dates and any security code), which could then be used to make 
fraudulent online purchases.  One of the most significant and publicized risks, however, is 
the breach of security on the part of the merchant or financial institution's computer system 
that stores the financial information of customers that made the payment card purchases.  
This relates to the risk of exposure of private information beyond the risk of fraudulent 
                                                          
94
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purchases.  The total fraud loss from debit and credit cards amounted to $4.1 billion in the 
United States in 2012 arising from 29.8 million unauthorized transactions.
95  Debit card 
transactions that require a PIN have the lowest estimated fraud rates by both number and 
value of all card types.
96
  This suggests that with the adoption of Chip and Pin technology 
(EMV)
97
 in the US, rates of fraud on debit and credit cards will decline. EMV cards are 
harder to clone than traditional magnetic strip cards and create a unique code for each 
transaction, a process called “tokenization,” which makes multiple fraudulent uses hard to 
achieve by processing payments without storing sensitive card information that could be 
vulnerable to an attack on a merchant’s computer system. Tokenization is also being 
implemented by MasterCard and Visa for electronic credit card payments (such as online 
purchases or in-store purchases made using a smartphone application),
98
 a potentially 
important development given concerns that increased use of EMV technology will shift 
fraud to the online payments channel.
99
  The major credit cards have set October 2015 as 
the deadline for retailers to adopt EMV technology for processing payments.  However, the 
cost of the terminals and the perceived slow roll-out of chip enabled cards in the US market 
has made some retailers resistant to adopting this technology.
100
 
 Efforts have been made to deal with the allocation of payment card fraud risk.  One 
of the common initiatives is the limitation of cardholder liability in cases of unauthorized 
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transactions, particularly for credit cards.  The United Kingdom's Consumer Credit Act 
limits credit cardholder liability to £50 in all cases of fraud.
101
  U.S. federal law limits 
consumer liability in credit card fraud to $50,
102
 which in practice is often waived by card 
issuers such that the entire amount is covered.  For debit cards, consumer liability is limited 
to $50 if notice is given to the issuing financial institution within two business days after 
learning of the loss or theft, and no higher than $500 if reported within 60 days.
103
 Because 
card issuers can ultimately be liable for fraudulent transactions, as in cases where the seller 
cannot be charged back, they have an incentive to monitor and prevent fraudulent 
transactions. In a sense, card issuers can be seen as providing insurance for fraudulent 
transactions, by spreading out, planning for, and bearing the risks of fraud, with the normal 
card fees serving partly as the insurance premium.  Furthermore, many jurisdictions have 
enacted legislation to protect personal and financial information stored by merchants and 
financial intermediaries, such as the requirement to encrypt stored information and 
mandatory disclosure to consumers when a security breach may have occurred.
104
 
 4. ACH Transfers 
 The issue of fraud and payment information security has been a central topic in the 
policy debate surrounding the ACH system. Furst and Nolle (2005) identify three features 
of ACH systems that make it particularly susceptible to fraud in comparison to debit or 
                                                          
101
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credit card transactions.
105
  First, the ACH system does not feature a system-wide way to 
link a payor's name, address, and deposit account number.  Second, the ACH system does 
not feature a real-time authorization of transactions unlike credit and debit cards.  Third, 
ACH systems do not have the kind of fraud detection mechanisms provided by credit and 
debit card issuers, such as the identification of seemingly anomalous transactions for a 
particular account, which may signal fraudulent activities.  There is evidence that the 
relatively recent one-time authorization ACH payments are particularly susceptible to fraud, 
compared to the traditional prearranged payments scheme.  For example, in 2004, about 
0.21% of all telephone-authorized ACH transfers were ultimately determined to be 
fraudulent, three times higher than the 0.07% in prearranged ACH payments.
106
  This could 
be partly explained by the lack of a preexisting relationship in these one-time ACH 
payments, which makes it difficult for the payor's financial institution to determine the 
authenticity and identity of the payee requesting a transfer or the alleged payor giving an 
authorization. 
            5.  Virtual or Digital Currencies 
Virtual currencies are dependent on the security and integrity of a dispersed and 
self-governing digital framework. This is a magnet for hackers and cyber criminals, as 
losses at the Mt.Gox Bitcoin exchange amply demonstrate. Essentially, digital currencies 
are “bearer instruments” that must be secured in virtual safes and wallets against theft.  
Recently, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau warned U.S. consumers about the 
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dangers of digital currencies, possibly foreshadowing the implementation of regulations 
designed to enhance the security and safety of these currencies.
107
 
F.     Financial Inclusion and Access 
 Financial inclusion is the delivery of financial services, such as credit, deposit 
services, and insurance, to disadvantaged and low income segments of the society that 
typically have limited access to financial services. Financial exclusion is defined by the 
European Commission as "a process whereby people encounter difficulties accessing 
and/or using financial services or products in the mainstream market that are appropriate to 
their needs and enable them to lead a normal social life in the society in which they 
belong."
108
  Financial inclusion has been identified as one of the goals of central banks 
throughout the world, and efforts continue worldwide to improve financial access for the 
low-income population. 
 Consequences of financial exclusion can be direct and dire for the people affected.  
People without financial access have limited choice of goods and services, as their payment 
options are severely limited, particularly in remote transactions.  They incur higher costs 
when trying to access financial services, such as remittance or check cashing services.  
Furthermore, financial exclusion often leads to further social exclusion in other areas of 
society that require financial access.  A 2007 study by the U.K. Treasury found that the 
total cost borne by a typical low-income family as a result of financial exclusion exceeded 
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£1000 over the course of a year, a significant amount to an already impoverished segment 
of society.
109
 
 While the problem of financial exclusion is more common and relevant in 
developing countries, where more than two-thirds of people don’t have access to any sort of 
bank account (rising to around 80% in rural sub-Saharan Africa),
110
 developed countries are 
not immune to the problem.  A study by the FDIC reported in 2014 that in 2013, an 
estimated 7.7% of the U.S. population was "unbanked," that is, without a checking or 
savings account.
111
  The U.K. Treasury estimates that about 5% of the U.K. population, and 
about 13% of the low-income population, was unbanked in 2007.
112
 
For payment systems to effectively serve the poor, they have to have: robust 
functionality; a low cost and a low price; and effective coordination between service 
providers. The Gates Foundation (2013) proposes that cost reduction and innovation in 
existing payment systems are the most effective means of improving financial inclusion. By 
lowering costs, the pool of customers that can be profitably served by retail payment 
systems is expanded, which spreads knowledge about such systems among previously 
under-served communities.
113
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 1. Cash 
 Cash is the standard payment instrument for financially excluded populations.  It is 
the only widely accepted payment that can be used without a bank account.  However, 
continued reliance on cash can drive the excluded population further from financial access.  
A cash-only payor typically finds it difficult to finance large purchases such as homes and 
cars, even in developing markets where such transactions are common. Personal security 
concerns from accumulating and handing over big sums are material. Payors could also 
incur cash usage surcharges in advanced economies.  
 2. Checks 
Checks present a hardship for unbanked payees, often in the context of employment 
compensation.  They must usually resort to non-bank check-cashing services in order to 
redeem their checks, which can have a hefty surcharge of 2% to 5% of the check value.
114
 
 3. Payment Cards 
 A credit card is a potential source of unsecured credit for people with limited 
banking access, and would eliminate the need for holding excessive liquidity.  It fares 
competitively with other loan options, and its streamlined application and settlement 
process makes it easier for card issuers to provide services to a low-income population.  
Low income and financially excluded people often find it difficult to get a typical bank loan 
due to the complex process involved, particularly as a result of their low credit score.  
                                                          
114
 Checks can also usually be cashed at the bank in written from, with or without fee, but a branch of the 
bank may not necessarily be accessible to the unbanked payee. 
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Alternative sources of loans, such as payday loans,
115
 are known for their high interest rate, 
sometimes reaching an effective rate of 300% per annum or more.   
The problem for the financially excluded population, unfortunately, is that obtaining 
a credit card and building a credit score often requires having a bank account and a good 
credit history in the first place, presenting a kind of vicious circle or chicken-and-egg 
problem that hampers their ability to access financial services.  One alternative is the use of 
prepaid cards.  Prepaid cards are payment cards to which a customer loads in a fixed dollar 
amount, and then uses the balance to make purchases.  Unlike debit or credit cards, a 
typical prepaid card is not tied to any particular bank account.  Prepaid cards are usually 
branded by card associations, such as Visa and MasterCard, and are processed by those 
card associations under rules similar to the rules that apply to debit and credit cards 
processed by those card associations.  As a result, prepaid cards can be beneficial to the 
unbanked or underbanked population by giving them access to transactions requiring use of 
payment cards without a need for a bank account.  However, the need for prepayment, like 
a bank deposit to support checks, restricts liquidity.  U.S. regulations provide consumer 
protections for prepaid payroll cards, prepaid cards that receive federal government 
payments and prepaid gift cards.  Furthermore, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
in November 2014 released proposed regulations that would expand protections for users of 
general-use prepaid cards, including provisions regulating fees, disclosures, and consumer 
                                                          
115
 A payday loan is a small, short-term loan, either unsecured or secured by the borrower's future paycheck, 
advanced by a nonbank business at an interest rate far higher than traditional loans.  
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liability in the event of fraud.
116
  Also, competitive market forces compel prepaid card 
issuers to provide some protection and features to consumers of these cards (such as 
limitations on liability and 800 numbers used to obtain transaction information).
117
 
4. ACH Transfers 
Some of the advantages provided by ACH transfers, such as accelerated liquidity 
from paychecks through direct deposit instead of traditional paper checks, are particularly 
relevant to the low-income population, which is more likely to be underbanked or unbanked.  
Unfortunately, the same problem plagues the beneficial use of the ACH system by these 
members of the society as in the case of payment cards: having a bank account is a 
precondition for ACH transactions because both ACH debit and credit transfers require an 
account from which funds can be accessed.  There is no indication that any development in 
the ACH system would work to improve financial inclusion and access to the system.  
5.           Virtual or Digital Currencies  
 Digital money schemes offer the potential of extremely low transaction costs but 
depend on a technology infrastructure that excluded communities have limited access to 
(although cheap smart phones may change this), therefore they do not necessarily advance 
financial inclusion.  Mobile money schemes like M-Pesa in Kenya have been very 
successful in expanding financial inclusion, but represent a means of transferring and 
accessing conventional cash and deposit money rather than digital currency. 
                                                          
116
 Rachel Witkowski, Cheat Sheet: Details of the CFPB’s Sweeping Plan to Regulate Prepaid Cards, 
AMERICAN BANKER (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulation-reform/cheat-sheet-
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 While some U.S. states tried to establish consumer protection rules for prepaid cards, courts have ruled that 
these rules are preempted by the federal law in cases of federally-chartered financial institutions issuing 
prepaid cards. See, e.g., SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F. 3d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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G. Fungibility and Ease of Use 
 Fungibility of a payment instrument refers to the idea that having one or few 
methods of payment, rather than many, is convenient for the consumer.  The problem of 
having to carry too many retail payment instruments is akin to an individual having too 
many IDs or passwords, resulting in general consumer inconvenience and difficulties in 
financial management, in addition to a higher chance of theft or loss.   
 Studies have been conducted to measure or estimate the value of convenience of 
various retail payment methods.  Arango at al. (2012),
118
 based on a 2009 survey by the 
Bank of Canada of the transaction diary of 3,500 consumers over three days, find that both 
cash and card payments are widely used in varying circumstances.  Debit and credit card 
payments comprised close to 80% of consumers’ transaction value, but cash accounted for 
over 54% of transaction volume, suggesting the widespread usage of cash in relatively 
small transactions.
119
  Arango and Taylor (2009)
120
 find that convenience is a statistically 
significant factor in the choice of method of payment by consumers, particularly in case of 
cash.   
For a payment instrument to be fungible, it must be widely, if not universally, 
accepted by merchants, and must also be convenient to use and carry.  An efficient retail 
payment system would have a high degree of acceptability such that consumers would not 
need to carry multiple payment instruments for different situations.  
 
                                                          
118
 See Carlos Arango, Dylan Hogg, & Alyssa Lee, Why Is Cash (Still) So Entrenched? Insights from the Bank 
of Canada's 2009 Methods-of-Payment Survey (2012). 
119
 Id. 
120
 See Role of Convenience and Risk in Consumers' Means of Payment, supra. 
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1. Cash 
While cash is widely acceptable, the acceptability of cash is no longer, if it ever was, 
universal.  Cash is either not available or logistically impossible to use in transactions 
involving very large value.  Vendors routinely refuse large denomination banknotes, as they 
are free to do,
121
 for fear of receiving counterfeit currencies.  Cash, by its nature, cannot be 
used in remote transactions.  An increasing number of vendors are implementing non-cash 
policies for their business or, at the least, imposing extra fees for consumers using cash 
instead of the vendor's preferred method of payment.
122
 Thus, in many parts of the world, a 
typical consumer is unlikely to find that carrying cash as the only payment instrument is 
feasible, especially considering the added risk of theft, robbery, and loss from carrying 
large amounts.  Despite these forces, a 2014 study of payment diary surveys from the U.S. 
and six other countries showed that, for the time being, cash remains the predominant 
method of payment for the smallest 50% of transactions.
123
  
2. Checks 
 Checks, it appears, rank low on fungibility.  Checks are not a common method of 
payment anymore in many parts of the world, and their acceptability is low.  Retail vendors 
may be deterred by the cost involved in processing small value checks, and the risk of non-
sufficient funds, whether due to fraud or inadvertence, when a large value is involved.  
                                                          
121
 More specifically, vendors may be obligated to accept cash as the settlement of debt for obligations already 
incurred by the purchaser. However, in many jurisdictions, vendors are free to refuse to enter into a 
transaction in the first place where the vendor does not like the consumer's intended method of payment. 
122
 See, e.g., Anna Tims, Why Cash is No Longer King, MONEY BLOG (Jul. 5, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/blog/2012/jul/05/cash-no-longer-king-penalties. 
123
 John Bagnall, David Bounie, Kim P. Huynh, Anneke Kosse, Tobias Schmidt, Scott Schuh and Helmut 
Stix, Consumer Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Comparison with Payment Diary Survey Data 15 (ECB 
Working Paper No. 1685) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436365. 
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Similar to cash, checks cannot be used in remote transactions.  Carrying a checkbook seems 
to be more cumbersome than carrying payment cards and possibly even cash.  As a result, 
checks seem to offer little in the way of fungibility and ease of use. 
 3. Payment Cards 
 Payment cards rate high in their ease of carrying, but their limited acceptance in 
some developing countries prevents them from being as fungible a retail payment 
instrument in developing countries as they are in developed countries.  In particular, the 
acceptance rate of payment cards is lower in developing countries without the sophisticated 
payment-processing infrastructure present in developed countries.  Payment cards are 
affected by the network effect.  That is, like the classical example of telephones, cards are 
only worth having and using when a certain threshold percentage of vendors accept them, 
and the utility of payment cards go up as the usage rate and acceptance rate rise.  Thus, 
usage and acceptance of payment cards can start a self-fuelling adoption throughout a 
developing country, in which more vendors become willing to incur the cost of 
infrastructure to accept card payments in order to prevent foregone sales from card-
preferring consumers that would take their business elsewhere.  This suggests an even 
greater role for policy makers in developing parts of the world, in which even a small 
increase or decrease in the incentive to adopt cards can have a large ramification in the 
country's eventual retail payment system environment. 
 4. ACH Transfers 
 While the recent development of one-time authorized ACH transactions has 
expanded the scope of their use, ACH transfers cannot be considered a fungible payment 
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instrument that can replace other retail payment instruments.  In particular, the use of ACH 
transfers is both uncommon and arguably cumbersome at the point-of-sale, requiring the 
payee to manually enter the payor's financial information from the paper check provided by 
the payor. 
              5.  Virtual or Digital Currencies 
  Digital cash currently ranks very low on fungibility due to its limited acceptance 
and use to date. It almost always needs to be converted into conventional money. The 
digital money exchange function represents an added layer of cost, complexity and risk to 
users. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 This paper has reviewed the costs of the components of the retail payment system, 
based on existing literature, with respect to seven desirable characteristics: (1) finality and 
reversibility;  (2) universality (ability to use at point of sale and remotely); (3) 
recordkeeping; (4) liquidity (maximizing interest earning assets); (5) security and safety; 
(6) financial inclusion and access; and (7) fungibility and ease of use.  The following table 
is a summary of the findings.  Overall, as the summary below suggests, debit and credit 
cards seem to be the most desirable payment system across these seven characteristics. 
 Both cash and digital currencies do not offer reversibility, with consumers bearing 
the transaction risk of payees not honoring their promises.  Checks have limited finality 
within the time between payment and the actual debiting of the payor’s account, but have 
no reversibility once the funds transfer is complete, creating the risk of fraud by both 
payors (who can stop payment on a check before it is debited even where goods received 
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are perfectly acceptable) and payees (who can obtain funds from a check and subsequently 
fail to fulfill their contract).  The legal rules surrounding ACH transfers make it difficult to 
reverse payments, as consumers may dispute ACH charges to their accounts only in limited 
circumstances, and receiving banks are not required to reverse a charge if doing so would 
overdraw the payee’s account or the account no longer exists.  Payment cards offer the 
greatest degree of reversibility, providing protection to consumers by allowing unilateral 
reversal of payments with minimal documentation or proof under card association and legal 
rules, which in turn benefits merchants by incentivizing risk-averse consumers to enter into 
transactions.  Card issuers, who investigate and resolve reversal disputes between 
consumers and merchants, mitigate the risk of consumer abuse of these protections. 
 Universality is a key feature of payment cards, as they offer both a high level of 
convenience for online transactions and strong consumer protections, substantially reducing 
the cost barrier of remote transactions for parties.  In contrast, cash and checks are 
unsuitable forms of payment for most remote transactions.  ACH transfers offer 
convenience for remote payments, particularly for payment of recurring bills; however, 
reduced consumer protection compared to payment cards increase the risk of these types of 
payments for consumers.  Digital currencies, for their part, allow for global and relatively 
frictionless transfers of value, but currently suffer from limited acceptability. 
 Payment cards offer significant advantages in facilitating recordkeeping, as they 
provide accurate, real-time electronic recording of payments, with the only cost to parties 
being the potential risks stemming from the fact that electronic records are not always 
secure.  ACH transfers, as a form of electronic payment, offer similar recordkeeping 
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advantages to cards. Cash is especially problematic for recordkeeping, as it requires manual 
recordkeeping by parties that may not detect fraud and is susceptible to error.  While checks 
offer recordkeeping advantages over cash through the creation of a paper trail, they require 
users to make manual entries of transactions.  Digital currencies offer anonymity as a 
claimed feature, thus they generally provide limited recordkeeping despite their digital 
nature. 
 In terms of liquidity, credit cards provide a unique benefit to consumers by allowing 
liquidity-constrained individuals to make purchases, which benefits merchants as well by 
enabling transactions that would not otherwise be possible.  Cash is unmatched in its ability 
to provide the means necessary for consumers to make daily payments; however, 
consumers bear the costs of foregone interest when holding excess cash, a non-interest 
bearing asset.  Debit cards, which typically access funds from low-interest checking 
accounts, pose the same costs of foregone interest as cash; meanwhile, checks drawn from 
these same types of accounts have additional transaction costs due to low acceptability in 
everyday transactions, and the delay between payment receipt and funds transfer.  While 
ACH transfers are similar to checks in terms of liquidity management, in that they involve 
foregone interest and delayed payment costs, the automated nature of the ACH system 
benefits businesses paid through recurring transfers by providing a timely, reliable cash 
flow.  Digital currencies, while difficult to invest due to the limited number of assets 
denominated in such currencies, allow for speculation on the value of the digital currency 
relative to sovereign currencies. 
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 Fraud poses a significant security risk to issuers and payees of payment cards, 
particularly through card skimming and computer system breaches; however, consumer 
protection laws and card network policies have largely eliminated the security risks to 
consumers.  Cash, which is both an attractive target of theft and subject to counterfeiting, 
poses risks to consumers and merchants alike, though loss of cash poses necessarily limited 
damage.  Checks are subject to forgery and alteration; moreover, the possibility of float 
creates a unique risk of fraud by payors.  The ACH system is particularly susceptible to 
fraud for three reasons: the lack of a system-wide method for linking a payor’s name, 
address, and deposit account number; the lack of real-time authorization of payments as is 
done for credit and debit card payments; and the lack of fraud detection mechanisms similar 
to those used by payment card issuers.  Digital currencies, for their part, have proved 
particularly fertile ground for hackers and cyber criminals, given the currencies’ 
dependence on the security of a dispersed, self-governing digital framework. 
 Cash is the standard payment instrument for individuals lacking financial inclusion 
and access, though it can drive that population further away from financial access due to the 
difficulty of financing large transactions (such as home and car purchases) with cash alone.  
Checks present a hardship for unbanked payees, who must resort to high-fee cash-checking 
services to redeem checks; similarly, ACH transfers require a bank account, and thus the 
ACH system is largely unable to improve financial inclusion.  Payment cards possess 
multiple features that would be of benefit to financially excluded individuals, such as 
access to unsecured credit and reduced need for excessive liquidity, yet obtaining a 
payment card often requires a bank account and good credit history.  An alternative is the 
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use of prepaid cards, which are not tied to a bank account and thus can be beneficial to 
persons lacking financial access, despite the restricted liquidity that results from the need 
for prepayment.  Digital currencies, while offering extremely low transaction costs, depend 
on technology that is often out of reach for financially excluded communities. 
 Payment cards represent an extremely fungible payment method in developed 
countries, where payment-processing infrastructure is ubiquitous.  While cash is widely 
acceptable, it is not universally so, particularly in large or remote transactions, due to 
security and logistical risks for both consumers and merchants.  Checks rank low on 
fungibility, with limited acceptability due to fraud risks and processing costs, and less 
convenience for consumers than cash or payment cards.  Both ACH transfers and digital 
currencies lack wide acceptance, and thus are not fungible payment methods. 
 Looking at use statistics overall, based upon BIS CPMI studies, it would appear the 
Coase Theorem has been vindicated, as retail payments have increasingly moved toward 
card payments,
124
 the relative costs and benefits of which best achieve the interests of the 
parties and therefore maximize Coasian efficiency. In 1988, 84% of non-cash payments in 
the US were by check, 14% by credit card, and the remaining 2% by ACH, which had 
gained almost no traction since its inception 20 years before. Some 80% of non-cash 
payments were processed by the Federal Reserve (most checks, all ACH), and debit cards 
(useable also at ATMs) had yet to reach significant use for transactions.  The payment 
system was simple: banks cleared checks and dispensed cash, which dominated POS 
transactions. Few merchants dealt in any other form of tender.  Today, however, about 66% 
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of non-cash payment is by card, a majority by debit card, with 11% by ACH and only 16% 
by check. 
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Between 1988 and 2012, payment cards have gone from very small levels of use 
(1% or less in several countries) to as much as 77% in Canada and 43% or above in every 
CPMI country except Germany and Singapore (both of which have experienced significant 
growth in card payments in recent years). Checks have effectively disappeared in 6 of the 
11 countries, and are above 10% of retail payments in only four countries. 
 As stated earlier, when a payment system balances the interests and reduces the 
risks undertaken by counterparties to a market contract, it reduces the total cost of 
contracting and thereby increases the scope for market contracting between parties.  For 
this reason, the notion that the total cost of the payment system is frictional waste to the 
economy and a misallocation of societal resources is fallacious.  An efficient payment 
system increases commerce because it facilitates productive transactions.  The issue is not 
how cheap it is to make a payment, but how and to what extent payments increase 
productive economic activity.   A recent study by Moody’s Analytics estimates that greater 
use of credit and debit cards in 2008-2012 raised consumption by an average of 0.7% of 
GDP across a range of 56 countries, and raised it more for emerging markets (0.8%) than 
for developed countries (0.3%).
125
  Greater use of these card payments increased global 
economic growth by $983 billion.
126
  Economies grow faster when people are free and able 
to contract, and make payments, according to their desires.  
  Regulation should generally require some demonstration of market failure beyond 
mere cost to end users of the payment system. The costs of the payment system are largely 
                                                          
125
 Mark Zandi, Virenda Singh & Justin Irving, The Impact of Electronic Payments on Economic Growth (Feb. 
2013), at 3. 
126
 Id. 
-68- 
 
 
 
a result of the mix of instruments used, which in turn reflects the desires of the parties for 
particular features and results. As we have demonstrated, these market forces have led to 
products like credit cards achieving widespread adoption based on perceived value while 
less feature rich methods like cash and checks are in secular decline. Regulation should be 
mindful of unintended consequences and be based on economic analysis rather than 
abstract, if admirable, principles of best practice. For example, the introduction of low cost 
public networks or price controls on private operators may achieve cheaper payment 
systems, but at the much higher cost of less economic activity, since payment systems will 
not be flexible enough to accommodate the needs of businesses and households in a rapidly 
changing global economy. The summary below suggests that overall card payments 
maximize the benefits to be achieved by different forms of payment. 
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DESIRABLE PAYMENT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Cash Check 
Debit 
Card 
Credit 
Card 
ACH 
Transfer 
Digital 
Currencies 
Finality High Low Medium Medium Medium High 
Reversibility Low Low Medium High Medium Low 
Usability in Remote 
Commerce 
Low Low Medium High Medium Low 
Recordkeeping Low Medium High High High Medium 
Liquidity 
Management and 
Maximization of 
Interest-bearing 
Assets 
Low Low Medium High Medium Medium 
Security and Safety Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Low 
Financial Inclusion High Low Medium Medium Medium Low 
Fungibility and Ease 
of Use 
Medium Low High High Low Low* 
 
*Based on existing low levels of usage 
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